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The Future of Legal Education for Practical Skills:
Can the Innovations Survive?
Charles D. Kelso* and M. Jane KeLso**
Donald W. Jackson and E. Gordon Gee have distinguished
themselves with yet another empirically oriented study of legal
educati0n.l This time, however, Gee and Jackson eschew mere
description. To improve the quality of debate on the future of
American legal education, they invite us to consider several intriguing hypotheses. Their review of the history of legal education
in both America and England, their firsthand observation of present English legal education methods, and their evaluation of current data generated by interviews and questionnaires a t ten
American law schools lead them to suggest the following hypotheses:
(1) Large scale change in legal education is unlikely in the
short run and exceedingly difficult to implement, maintain, and
disseminate in the long run.
(2) Factors associated with the persistence of an innovation
are (a) ability to convey essential ideas and skills in "at least a
minimally acceptable" manner, (b) lower cost than alternatives,
(c) ease of administration and application, and (d) consistency
with the overall structure and system of the institution, including
the faculty reward and incentive structure.
(3) Factors associated with the decline of an innovation are
(a) great cost (especially if the cost is visible), (b) need for high
levels of time and energy commitment, (c) need for substantial
institutional adaptation for both implementation and integration
with the totality of the law school curriculum, and (d) inconsistency with the extant system of rewards and incentives.
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. A.B., J.D., The
University of Chicago; LL.M., Columbia University; LL.D., John Marshall University;
J.S.D., Columbia University. Professor Kelso is currently Editor of Learning and the Law.
** A.B., University of Illinois; J.D., Indiana University. Mrs. Kelso is currently a
Law Lecturer at Indiana-Purdue University-Indianapolis and Associate Director of the
Interschool PLAT0 Program for Developing Lawyer Competencies.
1. Gee and Jackson's first study provided details on the formally and informally
required curricula in American law schools. E. GEE & D. JACKSON,
FOLLOWING
THE
LEADER?:
THE UNEXAMINED
CONSENSUS
IN LAWSCHOOL
CURRICULA
(1975). Their second
study analyzed the number of course registrations in elective courses and related those
& E. GEE,BREAD
AND BUTTER?:
ELECTIVES
courses to bar examination subjects. D. JACKSON
IN AMERICAN
LEGAL
EDUCATION
(1975). See Kelso, Book Review, 1976 B.Y.U.L.
REV.597.
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Illustrating how these hypotheses apply, Gee and Jackson
point to the tension between the theoretical orientation usually
found implicit in the case method (legal education's most successful innovation) and recurrent calls for a more practical orientation. Examples of such calls include the Chief Justice's Sonnett
lecture,* the Clare proposal^,^ formation of the Devitt Committee,' and Arch Cantrall's articles of some years ago.5 Of course,
the most highly visible point of tension is the continuing debate
on clinical legal education.
An application of the Gee and Jackson hypotheses suggests
that the future of clinical legal education is in doubt because all
of the factors associated with the decline of an innovation are
present. Although substantial financial assistance from the
Council on Legal Education for Professional Responsibility
(CLEPR) has allowed most law schools to now offer some form
of clinical education, CLEPR's millions are coming to an end at
a time when the costs of clinical education are thought to be
relatively great and highly visible. Effective clinical education
not only requires an enormous expenditure of teacher time and
energy, but also calls for teacher-student relationships quite foreign to the usual classroom pattern. Clinical legal education is a
recent innovation and represents a large scale change from traditional legal education models. In addition, conventional tenure
and promotion tracks are not well adapted to the career patterns
of clinical teachers.
Gee and Jackson suggest that clinical legal education would
more likely continue its growth if efforts were made to alter the
balance of factors that lead to decline or persistence. Thus, they
advise tapping alternative sources of funding, reducing the load
2. Adapted in Burger, Advocacy on Trial, LEARNING
AND THE LAW,Spring 1974, a t 26.
3. Discussion pro and con may be found in Pedrick & Frank, We Are Faced with a
AND THE LAW,Winter 1976, at 46; The Special ComClare and Present Danger, LEARNING
mittee on Admission to the Bar of the Association of American Law Schools, Confusing
AND T H E LAW,Summer 1976,
Incompetency with Inadequacy is a Big Mistake, LEARNING
AND THE
at 41; Silverman, Ending the Myths that Plague the Clare Proposals, LEARNING
LAW,Summer 1976, a t 22; The Open Door Policy on Trial: A Symposium, LEARNING
AND
THE LAW,Winter 1975, a t 46.
4. The Committee to Consider Standards for Admission to Practice in Federal
Courts, appointed by Chief Justice Burger, and under the chairmanship of Judge Edward
J. Devitt, is considering how the quality of advocacy in the federal courts can best be
JOURNAL,
Spring 1977,
improved. Devitt, Improving Federal Trial Advocacy, THEJUDGES'
a t 40.
5. Cantrall, Law Schools and the Layman: Is Legal Education Doing Its Job?, 38
A.B.A.J. 907 (1952); Cantrall, Practical Skills Can and Must Be Taught in Law School, 6
316 (1954).
J . LEGALEDUC.
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of clinical teachers, and inventing teaching materials and techniques that would do for clinical teachers what the casebook did
for classroom teachers. Finally, Gee and Jackson suggest that
incentives for clinical teachers could be improved, perhaps by
providing alternative tracks toward promotion and tenure.
We find nothing here with which to disagree. We applaud
Gee and Jackson's careful assemblage of factual data and their
effort to mine it for evidence of trends, causal conditions, and
projections. We believe that the context of legal education should
be as broad as life itself and should include concern for the goals
and consequences contingent on the exercise of our professional
knowledge and skill. When the data is viewed from this perspective, additional trend and causation hypotheses emerge that not
only indicate who has been responsible for what, but also suggest
several projections and alternative futures that Gee and Jackson
have not discussed. Details follow as we pursue Gee and Jackson's
goal of contributing to the debate on the future of American legal
education.

Gee and Jackson's review of historical and other data leads
us to suggest four additional hypotheses:
(1) The bar increasingly has become content not to have
major responsibility for the initial education of future lawyers.
During the past 100 years, legal education in university-related
law schools has been substituted for education in proprietary or
independent schools and for the apprenticeship of students t o
individual practicing lawyers. Retreating from direct responsibility for legal education, the practicing bar appears content to rely
on bar examinations to test the quality of an applicant's legal
education. There is little indication that the practicing bar is
currently prepared to assume the massive educational responsibility of training, for a substantial period of time, each year's
wave of over 30,000 graduating law students. To the extent that
practicing lawyers or judges wish to participate in law school
education, they normally have ample opportunitites to teach on
a part-time basis or in other ways to assist in law school programs
of education and research.
(2) Substantial innovation does not frequently originate
within law schools and usually occurs only if it is supported by
(or at least is not opposed by) external forces. Invention of the
casebook method occurred when law schools were under no pres-
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sure from bar admission authorities or accrediting agencies to use
any other method. The anti-elitist philosophy of the Jacksonian
era, beginning in the 1820's, had resulted in the destruction of
almost all educational requirements for admission to the bar. By
the 1870's, state laws no longer supported apprenticeship. Consequently, university-related schools could reasonably seek to attract good students by offering something different from either
apprenticeships with practicing attorneys or lectures given in proprietary schools. Having succeeded in that endeavor, law school
educators successfully locked Dean Langdell's vision into place
through actions of the American Bar Association (ABA), the Association of American Law Schools (AALS), and, later on, the
admission authorities. Today, however, further innovation is not
prompted by the bar examinations, the ABA's standards for approval of law schools, or the AALS articles of membership. The
climate for innovation is further tempered by the felt need to
distribute research and development funds equally among all faculty members or ranks, except to the extent that a faculty member by individual initiative is successful in attracting a grant.
(3) Law schools have been quite malleable when external
pressures, including grants, have impacted upon the length of law
school programs, the curriculum, the composition of the faculty,
admission requirements, and the size of a library. Gee and Jackson's historical review shows the rapid movement of law schools
to comply when external standards have been changed. For example, they note that when the ABA issued its first list of approved schools in 1923, twenty-seven of the thirty-nine schools on
the list had not been in compliance with the standards when they
had been adopted only two years before.
We suspect that law school pliability has increased in recent
years as the governance of law schools has increasingly shifted
from decanal authority to faculty meetings. Whereas deans once
served in office under governance conditions and for a long
enough period of time to build up expertise in relating to outside
forces, today they typically serve for less than six years. Functionally, today's deans closely resemble chairpersons of a faculty
committee of the whole. Coming from the faculty and planning
to return to careers in teaching and research, they will likely
mirror whatever is the common denominator of the faculty. A
desire for innovation is not likely to be that common denominator, since faculty members usually accomodate their individual
interests in teaching and research to whatever is necessary to
maintain the school's accreditation and prestige. Because law
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faculties normally lack collective expertise in dealing with outside forces, and because it is now more difficult for deans to
develop such leadership expertise, most law schools hesitate to
take risks with innovations that are not encouraged by or compatible with external standards.
(4) Law schools have affected the forces impinging on t h e m
from outside organizations only when at least a substantial n u m ber of schools, including prestigious leaders, have been united
behind a concept and have worked largely from inside the i n pinging organizat ions-as by having professors and current or
exdeans i n positions of influence i n the A B A Section of Legal
Education or the National Conference of Bar Examiners.
The ABA Standards of 1921 are described by Gee and Jackson as victories for schoolmen. It is not clear what developments
since 1921 should be so regarded, other than perhaps the successful implementation of the 1921 policy decisions. With reference
to practice skills education, Gee and Jackson have not presented
any evidence indicating that clinical teachers are yet sufficiently
organized, motivated, or well-placed to exert a substantial influence on external sources. Nor are clinical teachers typically in a
good position to be influential within their respective schools,
since most are recent appointees to the faculty.
There is, of course, a Section of Clinical Legal Education
within the AALS. It has presented programs for annual meetings
and has initiated a newsletter. Its most ambitious undertaking
has been a national conference of clinical law teachers held a t
Cleveland State University School of Law on October 20-22,1977.
Supported by a grant from CLEPR, the conference focused on the
theory and practice of clinical legal education as a means for
teaching professional responsibility as well as practice skills.
Nevertheless, whether clinical education is defined narrowly as
programs in which students work directly with actual clients, or
is considered more broadly to include problem and simulation
approaches to the teaching of practice skills, it is not clear a t this
writing whether a foundation has been laid for bringing clinical
teachers together in a coordinated program designed to work out
a comprehensive theory for clinical legal education.

When the above four hypotheses on trends and causal factors
are added to those articulated by Gee and Jackson, what projections can be made for practice skills education? It seems clear
that the causal factor which today has the most potential for
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insuring the future of practice skills education in the United
States is the Joint ABA-AALS Committee for the Project on
Guidelines for Clinical Programs in Law Schools. Chaired by
Dean Robert B. McKay and supported by a grant from CLEPR,
the committee is undertaking, under the direction of Professor
Steven H. Leleiko, a two-year study of clinical legal education.
Its charge includes the responsibility to develop guidelines for
assessing the quality of clinical legal education programs. Such
guidelines, particularly if found useful and workable by the
ABA's Accreditation Committee in the context of actual accreditation visits, might well become part of the ABA standards for the
Approval of Law Schools either through interpretation or amendment. Indeed, as a result of its study and/or subsequent experience with guidelines, the Council might well recommend to the
ABA House of Delegates that the ABA Standards be amended to
require at least some practice skills education for every law student. If this were to happen, there can be little doubt that the
clinical field would be invigorated by a spate of scholarship similar to that which followed the ABA Amendment of Standard
402(a) mandating that some instruction in professional responsibility be required of every law student. At or about the time of
that decision, and continuing today, scholarship has proliferated
(as evidenced by the number of new coursebooks in the area),
problem-method innovations have begun to appear, and a fine set
of television tapes on ethical dilemmas has been made available
by the ABA Consortium on Professional Education.
Practice skills education could be locked into place-just as
torts, contracts, and professional responsibility have been locked
in-by a few words of text calling for law schools to require training in such skills of all student candidates for a professional degree. A wide variety of educational experiences could provide this
training, including, but not limited to, supervised work with actual clients.
We predict that such a requirement is not likely to be imposed unless a coordinating arrangement is made with bar examining authorities. The data Gee and Jackson collected in their
earlier studies show that about 85% of all course registrations
(required and elective) may be affected by impending bar examin a t i o n ~Adding
.~
a practice skills requirement would further limit
6. See Kelso & Kelso, M u s t Bar E x a m s Distort Legal Education?, THEJUDGES'
JOURNAL, Spring 1977, at 17; see also Kelso, supra note 1; Kelso, I n the Shadow of the
Bar Examiner, Can True Lawyering Be Taught?, LEARNING
AND THE LAW,Winter 1976, at
38.
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student electives and discourage curriculum diversity. However,
if the bar examination authorities permitted candidates to take
the bar exam sometime after the first year in law school, the
situation would be different. The third year of law school, freed
from the shadow of the bar examination, could sensibly include
a practice skills requirement, and the ABA Committee might so
recommend. We understand that the ABA, AALS, National Conference of Bar Examiners, Law School Admissions Council, and
other organizations whose functions relate to legal education are
planning a series of coordinating conferences. An action plan designed to coordinate practice skills education and the bar exam
could well work its way onto the agenda.
A coordinated move might bring into legal education new
resources not otherwise available. For example, it might help
induce the Ford Foundation to make a n additional grant to
CLEPR, justify additional appropriations by Congress to the
National Legal Services Corporation, and persuade the ABA to
strengthen its Consortium for Professional Education so that its
efforts focused on pre-admission-to-practice as well as on postadmission education. I t would also give the law schools an additional reason to call upon local practitioners and judges to contribute their services (or to work for a small honorarium) in the
pursuit of clinical education, thus reestablishing the best part of
the apprenticeship system. Further, it would give the law schools
an additional budget justification in their dealings with parent
universities. Finally, it might make the schools more responsive
to opportunities for undertaking programs of education and service to state agencies willing to enter into contracts with law
schools for such services.
Another external development that could impact favorably
on clinical and other forms of practice skills education would be
the successful development and implementation of a national
boards examination on practice skills. Dean Fred Hart of New
Mexico, working within the framework of a law school consortium, is directing a project designed to create such tests. More
than 100 law schools have given preliminary indications of interest in cooperating. The enterprise has been funded by a grant to
CLEPR from the Fund for the Improvement of Post-secondary
Education. Taking such a test (or test battery) may ultimately
It is true, of course, that ABA Standard 306 permits 300 of the required 1200 residence
and class hours to be satisfied by substituting something other than regularly scheduled
class sections. However, law school decisionmaking is in the hands of classroom teachers
rather than clinical teachers.
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lead to a prestigious certificate or somehow become linked to the
bar admission process. If so, it would have the kind of catalytic
effect on practice skills education that national moot court and
client counseling competitions have on the courses that develop
those skills.
Predicting the future is more complex with respect to an
innovation from within the law schools that would do for clinical
teachers what the casebook did for classroom teachers. Gee and
Jackson point out that nothing in the history of legal education
has had the impact of the casebook method. It was inexpensive
to create and use; it combined theoretical and practical education
(at least for roles involved in appeals) ; and, perhaps most importantly, it involved teachers and students in an educationally rewarding interactive dialogue that could proceed either deductively or inductively. It is not easy, however, to see how a closely
comparable result can be achieved in teaching students how to
deal with clients and function in nonadjudicative lawyer roles in
office practice.
Nevertheless, the future in this regard is less opaque if we
make a sincere effort to free our imagination from the casebook
analogy. First, let us not assume that all innovation must be the
product of a lone scholar (or even coauthors working at several
schools). In recent times, great innovations in technology have
resulted from team efforts. If teams a t or from several law schools
tackled various jobs and competencies, as identified by a functional analysis, the necessary critical mass of energy and ideas
might be developed to give birth to a powerful innovation. At the
very least, the task of developing workable clinical education innovations might be divided into an agreed set of fields or areas
for individual work.
In looking ahead to the possible parameters of practice skills
innovation, we should not allow ourselves to think only in terms
of printed material put between hard covers. Instead, we should
think in terms of a total teaching environment and associated
programs. Optimum development of practice skills may require
an environment even more complex and interactive than a classroom, a teacher, and students who have read cases assembled in
a coursebook. The teaching environment may have to resemble
the real world of practice in many important respects.'
- -- -

-

--

7. Thus, there may be a need for one or more schools to maintain a television staff
and, perhaps, a staff associated with a national or regional network of computer-based
instruction. Perhaps there will be an interface between this technology and others, such
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Ideally, a facility specially designed for practice skills education should serve as the laboratory for clinical learning and experimentation, the library of current events, and the nerve center of
teacher-student-client interaction. Separate housing, specialized
equipment, and a trained staff would greatly facilitate the precise
observing and recording of lawyering activity in all of its manifestations, as well as provide effective and efficient educational feedback to students from such observations. The building should
also have the facilities and staff for obtaining up-to-date information on the developing factual context in which cases arise and
are handled in the courts or otherwise. There should be systematic followup on cases to evaluate the lawyering, the legal processes, and the development of the law. Further, the staff should
be collecting and processing political and socioeconomic information about the larger context of local, state, national, and international communities in which law is but one of many forces. Most
importantly, the building should house personnel who would subject that information to the full range of "policy science" processes explicated by Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal. This
policy science is a professional decisionmaking process characterized by clarifying goals, discovering trends and causal conditions,
making projections, and choosing and pursuing alternatives in
light of what is most likely to produce preferred outcomes with
an optimum expenditure of time and other resource^.^
Cooperative innovation of this magnitude will more likely
come into being if the accrediting authorities reconsider certain
standards or criteria for membership. If innovation in clinical
education requires teamwork by different kinds of specialists,
working perhaps at different schools, or calls for a substantial
amount of instrumentation or facility redesign, resources will
have to be withheld or shifted away from conventional areas such
as enlarging the library and increasing the number of full-time
as LEXIS, WESTLAW, and automatic typing machines, so that up-to-date teaching
materials could be distributed instantly and duplicated a t each law school (rather than
printed a t a central location and mailed to bookstores).
8. Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training
in the Public Interest, 52 YALEL.J. 203 (1943).
If the facility's programs encompassed a constituency more inclusive than the school's
students, new resources might be brought into the school. For example, the school might
educate the public on how law helps preserve individual liberty and increase the civil
domain in which people reasonably are free from all forms of coercion. The public may
learn that the law also seeks to ensure equality of opportunity, encourage the maximum
production and sharing of all values, and preserve a t least a minimal level of subsistence
for all persons.
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faculty. Given the limitations on current budgets and the trend
of faculty input on law school decisions, present accrediting standards exert a powerful restraining influence on any such reallocation of resources. Thus, the following amendments to ABA Standards might improve the climate for innovation in the law
schools.
First, under the heading "Faculty" the ABA might consider
creating a new Standard 402(c) which would provide:
Law schools may substitute in place of a reasonable number of
additional full-time faculty members specialists in educational
technology, clinicians, staff members, or technology where the
effect of such substitution on the school's educational program
is the equivalent of adding an additional faculty member.

Again, ABA Standards with respect to the law library are,
quite arguably, forcing each law school to collect a great deal of
material that is or could be readily available through other means
and to develop a staff of professionals whose expertise is solely in
the handling of a conventional library. LEXIS, WESTLAW, and
other systems of electronic storage and retrieval of legal text will
surely substitute for a great many bound volumes in years not too
far ahead. To pave the way for this change, ABA Standard 603(h)
might well be amended to provide:
To the extent that a law library can make the text of legal
material readily available by computerized research or otherwise, such technology may be used in substitution for publications in conventional bound form.

The development of innovations in clinical legal education
necessarily involves an evaluation of the competing values that
form the underpinnings of the debate between theoretical and
practical orientations toward learning. For guidance on values to
use in assessing legal education and charting its future, we should
heed some wise people. We turn first to Dean Robert B. McKay,
who recently wrote:
Without question legal education in the United States has met
the test of technical proficiency. The law faculties are superb;
the law students are at least as good; the libraries are generally
excellent and the structures that house the law schools are often
magnificent. In all these respects the law schools are stronger
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than ever before and better than their counterparts in any other
part of the world.g

Despite this favorable overall judgment on technical proficiency, Dean McKay also expressed disappointment that certain
opportunities have been missed. He said that the law schools
have remained almost exclusively professional in tone, rejecting
repeated attempts for infusion of other social sciences and the
humanities (even as background for understanding the context of
legal issues). He admitted that almost all law schools now offer
clinical courses in which law students represent actual clients
under faculty supervision. However, he also said:
The proud claim to professionalism has been more facade than
solid structure. If the interest in professional training had been
the sole motivating force, we should long ago have required clinical training of all law students or at least have continued the
apprentice programs that were long ago abandoned in nearly all
jurisdictions. lo

In this and other ways, according to Dean McKay, the law
schools have not done as much as they should have done in leading the profession toward higher levels of professional ethics and
responsibility. In his opinion
[llaw schools should be justice schools in which law students
are taught not only the need for faithful advocacy of their
clients' causes, but also their professional obligation to improve
the system for the delivery of justice; where law students are
taught the obligation (and the excitement) of representing the
poor and middle-income groups as well as the rich; and where
professional responsibility is the most, not the least important
matter to be taught."

Assuming Dean McKay's goals are generally accepted, how
can they best be accomplished? A classic debate on the subject
by two law school greats occurred in 1949. Professor Lon Fuller
argued that law school education should immerse students in the
processes of adjudication and legislation.12 These processes
should include what Professor Louis M. Brown would call
9. McKay, Legal Education, in AMERICAN
LAW:THETHIRD
CENTURY
261-62 (1976) (a
collection of lectures delivered at the Bicentennial celebration of the New York University
School of Law).
10. Id. at 263-64.
AND THE LAW,Summer
11. McKay, A Plague of Simplistic Assumptions, LEARNING
1977, at 11, 15.
12. Fuller, W h a t the Law Schools Can Contribute to the Making of Lawyers, 1 J .
LEGAL
EDUC.189 (1948).
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"preventive law" for clients, and focus particular attention on
issues of professional responsibility as they arise.13Necessary lawyer skills would emerge as a welcome byproduct of this concentration of attention. Professor Karl Llewellyn, disagreeing, urged
instead that law schools focus on training students for "the law
jobs" by emphasizing instruction in the various functional tasks
of lawyers, particularly spokesmanship.14This exchange of views
mirrors the tension between practical and theoretical emphasis
that Gee and Jackson found pervasive in the history and current
debate of American legal education. If the decline or persistence
of innovation is fully and accurately described by Gee and Jackson's hypotheses and the four hypotheses we have drawn from
their data, then Fuller seems destined to win. His view is more
compatible with the casebook method, while some, but not all,
of Llewellyn's goals can be accomplished with cases and problems.
It seems that the best way to pursue the McKay goals and
to escape from the horns of the Fuller-Llewelyn dilemma is t o
view desired consequences in terms of a sufficiently high level of
process and values. This will lead to concentration on developing
sufficiently comprehensive models of processes for the making,
implementing, and reviewing of decisions. Therefore, our preceding four hypotheses, when combined with the Gee and Jackson
principles on the decline and persistence of innovation, suggest a
fifth factual hypothesis that might resolve the apparently hopeless dilemma posed for practice skills education, particularly clinical education:
W h e n able people i n legal education visualize a desirable
goal with sufficient clarity, they find the way to combine and
focus their energies to bring about innovation and to effect the
institutional changes, internal and external, necessary to insure
its survival.

According to the above hypothesis, the major prerequisite t o
innovation is visualizing with sufficient clarity a desirable goal,
such as providing the optimum education for future lawyers.
Writing in 1943, Professor McDougal identified one area of training indispensable to the optimum legal education when he as13. See L. BROWN
& E. DAUER,
PERSPECTIVES
ON THE LAWYER
AS PLANNER
(1978); New
AND THE LAW,Summer 1974, at 8,
Ways to Teach Lawyering: A Symposium, LEARNING
69-71; Brown & Brown, What Counsels the Counselor? The Code of Professionul Responsibility's Ethical Considerations-A Preventative Law Analysis, 10 VAL.L. REV.453 (1976).
EDUC.211 (1948).
14. Llewellyn, The Current Crisis i n Legal Education, 1 J . LEGAL
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serted that "[nlone who deal with the law, however defined, can
escape policy when policy is defined as the making of important
decisions which affect the distribution of values."15 In a recent
address to the Law School Admission Council, he further explained why policymaking is the fundamental role of attorneys in
today's society and invited legal educators to identify the more
specific lawyering roles and skills required for their performance:
The position that Professor Lasswell and I took many years ago
was that while all law is policy, not all policy is law. All law, in
the sense that it affects a distribution of values among people
in a community, is policy; some policy is, however, naked power.
Whether we like it or not, law schools, lawyers, government
officials, all of us, are working with values all the time. The only
question is how consciously, how deliberately, and how systematically we formulate and clarify these values.
President Levi [later Attorney General Levi] indicated
very aptly when he remarked that the legal profession has always had a high concern for our great inheritance of the Western
European values of human dignity. . . .
In your more detailed clarification of the basic community
policies you serve, you need to become more precise about the
goals for which you choose and train lawyers. One common conception of a profession is that it is a group that has not only a
special skill but also a responsible concern for the goals and
aggregate consequences of the exercise of this skill.
From this perspective, the social role of the lawyer is that
of the specialist on authority and control who has a responsible
concern for the common interests of all the communities of
which he is a member. The function of the lawyer is to assist in
the establishment and maintenance of the totality of a community's public order-to reduce the number of decisions taken
by mere naked power, to manage authority and control in a way
that will maximize the production and sharing of all values, and
to increase the civic domain in which people are free from all
forms of coercion.
In the performance of this general role, the lawyer must
obviously engage in many more specific roles or tasks. Your first
task is to identify these more specific roles and tasks and the
capabilities and skills required for their performance. It should
scarcely require saying that your every effort should be to encourage pluralism and experimentation.16
15. Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 8, at 207 (emphasis in original).
AND THE LAW,Spring 1974, at
16. McDougal, Beware the Squid Function, LEARNING
16, 17-18.

1020

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[I977

It seems to us that the faculty members in the best position
to observe lawyers' roles and tasks, and the capabilities and skills
required for their performance, are those associated with clinical
programs or with other programs or courses in which practical
skills are directly taught. The challenge for developing the future
of legal education has clearly been cast bf~rofessorMcDougal
in a way that puts it squarely into the "ball park" of practical
skills teachers. Having been trained by the case method, and
usually having further developed their skills through actual practice experience, practice skills teachers are cast in the role of
professional observers and teachers in situations calling for practical wisdom. These faculty members should therefore be the
front line of research on what constitutes a legal professional, how
well the profession is fulfilling its responsibilities, and what kind
of future professionals can help the profession as a whole competently provide a broad range of lawyering services.
We cannot suppose that the necessary concepts of effective
clinical training will emerge if lawyering or social processes are
viewed from a low level of abstraction. Little is likely to develop
if practical skills education is viewed solely as the processing of
cases, e.g., interviewing poverty clients and serving their needs
through the use of law students and law school resources. Nor is
it useful to think only in terms of combining specific skills such
as direct and cross-examination. Rather, the faculty and students
must view the process as a unique window on the world that
allows them to observe, record, process, critique, reassemble, and
present back to students, the profession, and the world an accurate picture of what goes on when lawyers effectively reach decisions in support of responsible value choices. The goal is to build
ever better models of the processes involved in making, implementing, and reviewing responsible policy, strategy, and tactical
choices on behalf of clients or broader constituencies.
A review of the clinical decisionmaking process utilized by
doctors provides some useful clues as to how one might start a t a
sufficiently general level. When effective medical clinicians are
faced with a case, they generate alternative hypotheses in light
of the facts initially presented and, using their knowledge of basic
science, gather additional facts to subject those hypotheses to
confirming and disconfirming tests. The most effective clinicians
structure their diagnostic problems and their search for facts so
that proof of one hypothesis tends to disprove another." We law-

17. Kelso, In Quest of a Theory for Lawyering: Some Hypotheses and a Tribute to
Dean Soh Mentschikoff, 29 U . MIAMI
L.REV.159, 168-76(1975).
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yers also do that at each stage of our decisionmaking cycles. With
respect to arriving a t a basic choice of alternatives to implement
a policy, strategy, or tactical decision, our decisionmaking cycles
in each of our roles seem to involve the following tasks that have
been isolated by McDougal and Lasswell:18
(1) Clarify goals: What is it that we (andlor our clients or
other constituencies or communities) seek to accomplish?
(2) Determine trends: What is the degree to which these
preferred events have been realized to date?
(3) Determine causal conditions: What factors account for
the direction and intensity of change; does the explanation consist of a single factor or of multiple or (typically) interacting
factors?
(4) Make projections: What is likely to happen regardless of
my preferences?
(5) Consider alternatives: What alternatives will increase the
probability that preferred events will most economically occur?
To classify problem types and goal implementation in light
of these decisionmaking tasks, we would suggest a slightly more
elaborate scheme than did Professor Fuller. One can begin, as he
did, with adjudication, defining the task more broadly than litigation to include any processes in which decisions are based upon
proof of facts and upon arguments as to the interpretation and
application of rules. We can then add legislation, as he did, again
defining it very broadly to include the creation of rules to express
an accomodation of interests for governing situations or situation
types (whether the creation be done by a legislature or by a client
via a will or some collective manifestation of intention such as a
contract). We would elaborate on this analysis by breaking negotiation out of legislation. Negotiation may lead to the creation of
rules, as in a settlement agreement or a forward-looking contract;
it may, however, also lead to agreements that merely set up processes.19 The focus of attention in negotiating is on creating a
shared reality, i.e., future behavior. Developing rules to govern
-

-

-

18. See Laswell & McDougal, supra note 8.
19. Professor Fuller asks:
What is a contract? For the lawyer concerned with the adjudicative process a
contract is a legally enforceable agreement, and its meaning is that which a
court will give to it in the event of litigation. For the lawyer bringing a contract
into existence it may be primarily a framework for cooperative effort, which
performs its function without regard to its enforceability or the interpretations
a judge would give to it.
Fuller, supra note 12, at 195.
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future behavior is merely one means for creating contingencies
that help increase the probability of certain future behavior.
We would double back to argue that clarifying goals and
evaluating alternatives as part of advising or counseling persons
is as much a lawyer task as are litigation, legislation, and negotiation. It may also be useful to isolate and focus upon two other
areas: spokesmanship other than advocacy, and the recruitment,
selection, and training of personnel. Gathering facts, including
information on what a client or a constituency really wants or
needs, and predicting or evaluating the decisions of others are
probably competencies involved in tasks rather than tasks which
themselves directly serve to implement goals.1°
In traditional law classes, and even in practice skills courses,
law teachers tend to concentrate so much on the making and the
implementing of decisions that we usually do not consider the
evaluation or assessment of our own decisions as one of our basic
professional tasks. We evaluate judicial decisions, to be sure, but
typically as a means to better understand how or why the court
reached its decision or to argue that the court should have
reached a different decision or relied on different reasons. It is not
yet a standard part of our self-image as professionals to conduct
our practice in a relatively self-conscious way, subjecting our own
work and that of fellow lawyers to evaluative scrutiny in order to
improve its quality. In fact, when we are dealing with people we
typically begin to implement decisions in a tentative way, observing the reaction of persons we are seeking to persuade or from
whom we are seeking to learn. If our first tactic doesn't appear
to be working, we alter our initial approach. If that doesn't work,
or the results appear entirely discouraging, we may review our
entire strategy. We may even cycle back to review our basic goal
preferences (our policy decisions) and talk them over with ourselves, our colleagues, or our clients. It is to be expected that
practice skills teachers will perfect ways for giving feedback to
students from their clinical performances that will enhance sensitivity to the evaluative aspect of professional problem solving.
Hopefully, positive reverberations will appear at some future
time in the way law is practiced and the way the profession is
organized to sustain the quality of that practice.
The list of lawyer tasks might be elaborated further, though
we have no concrete proposals. Enough has been said to indicate
-

-

20. One useful analysis of lawyer competencies has been prepared by the
Competency-Based Task Force of Antioch School of Law.
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the kind of framework we would suggest to clinical and other
practice skills teachers around which they might usefully organize cooperative work to bring a sense of order to a field of instruction whose future is primarily their responsibility.
In sum, the means we recommend to achieve the goals expressed generally by Dean McKay and more specifically by Professor McDougal is to devise an approach to legal education that
more accurately reflects the realities of today's law practice and
society than does a system which includes only the casebook
method (or that method as supplemented by some problems and
materials). Of course, the knowledge and skills acquired in case
or problem method courses form an important part of the foundation for a professional education. It is for the clinician, however,
to integrate this kind of knowledge and skill into a fully contextual approach to professional problem solving.
To educate for this contextual approach to problem solving,
we should clearly reject Dean Langdell's concept that three years
of law study is best approached as a science leading to theoretical
knowledge, a science whose materials are appellate cases and
whose method is inducing principles from those cases. Instead, we
should assert that three years of education for a professional
career in law is best approached as an attempt to develop professional skill in making, implementing, and evaluating decisions in
light of their full context. If this calls for science, it is "policy
science."
In summary, the basic problem is to discover how values and
other kinds of reality intertwine in wise decisions made by lawyers in the various contexts that make up the set of roles and
tasks comprising their professional lives. The problem is not easy.
However, with the path blessed by Dean McKay, the trail
marked by Fuller and Llewellyn, the nature of the walk spelled
out by McDougal and Lasswell, and strikingly good innovations
appearing here and there, surely our clinical and practical skills
teachers can do a better job of getting together in this generation
of enhanced communication and travel than did the realists of a
generation ago. The only troubling uncertainty in this part of
legal education's future is the subjective-objective question of
whether today's practice skill teachers think well enough of themselves and their goals and tasks to make the necessary investment
of time and to take the risks inherent in any innovation.

